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Abstract
Substantial correlational evidence exists suggesting a critical role for prefrontal regions in honest 
and dishonest behavior, but causal evidence specifying the nature of this involvement remains 
absent. Here we show using the lesion method that damage to the human dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) decreased the effect of honesty concerns on behavior in economic games that pit 
honesty motives against self-interest, but did not affect decisions where honesty concerns were 
absent. These results point to a causal role for DLPFC in enabling honest behavior.
A wealth of field and laboratory studies have shown that humans are often willing to 
sacrifice their own economic payoffs in the interest of being honest, even in the absence of 
punishment or reputational factors1, 2. At the neural level, there is substantial evidence from 
both neuroimaging3–6 and developmental7, 8 literatures that the prefrontal cortices, in 
particular dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC) and orbitofrontal (OFC) cortices, play a critical 
role in decisions involving honesty. Due to the inherently correlational nature of such data, 
however, the specific role of these regions in honesty and dishonesty remains unclear. Here 
we sought to characterize the causal contribution of these regions by comparing the behavior 
of patients with focal lesions to either the DLPFC or OFC to that of healthy comparison 
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participants in a battery of signaling games extensively studied in behavioral economics and 
evolutionary biology9, 10 (Fig. 1, Supplementary Fig. 1-2, Supplementary Table 1, Online 
Methods). These games capture a core dilemma involved in honest behavior where interests 
of the signaler conflicts with those of the signal receiver, such as that of a seller (signaler) 
choosing to either truthfully disclose or misrepresent information about a product’s quality, 
which has direct monetary consequences for the buyer (signal receiver).
First, in the Message condition, the participant in the role of the signaler can send one of two 
messages to an anonymous counterpart in the role of the signal recipient, on the basis of 
which the recipient chooses one of two monetary allocation associated with the messages 
(Fig. 2a, Online Methods)2, 10. Importantly, both players were instructed that only the 
signaler would be informed about the monetary consequences associated with each option, 
and that recipients will never know if a message they received was true (Online Methods). 
This highlights the fact that the signal recipient is entirely reliant upon the signaler for 
potential information about the options, and prevents them from using payoff information to 
make inferences about signaler behavior2, 10.
In addition, to account for possible baseline differences in altruistic tendencies, we included 
a Choice condition that contained matching monetary consequences to those in the Message 
condition (Online Methods). The only difference between the conditions is that, in the 
Choice condition, participants directly chose between Option A and Option B. An individual 
who is completely insensitive to honesty concerns will behave identically in the two 
conditions, whereas those sensitive to honesty concerns are predicted to behave more 
generously in the Message condition. All choices were conducted using hypothetical payoffs 
and no feedback, with order of Message and Choice blocks counterbalanced across 
participants (Online Methods, Supplementary Table 2).
We first investigated how introduction of honesty concerns affected choice behavior in 
healthy participants by comparing altruistic giving in the Message and Choice conditions, 
defined as the amount received by the recipient following implementation of the 
participant’s decision, which for simplicity we refer to as “amount given” (Online Methods). 
Using paired comparisons on decisions with identical monetary consequences, we found that 
consistent with previous studies in healthy participants1, 2, 10, inclusion of honesty concerns 
in the Message condition substantially increased altruistic giving compared to the Choice 
condition (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < .001, two-tailed; Fig. 2b).
To test the extent to which prefrontal regions are causally involved in trade-offs between 
honesty concerns and economic self-interest, we next compared amount given between the 
Message and Choice conditions in patients with lesions to either DLPFC or OFC versus 
healthy participants. We found significant main effects of both condition (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p < .001, two-tailed), such that participants on average gave more in the Message 
condition ($7.90 ± .20) than in the Choice condition ($4.14 ± .24), and cohort (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p < .001, two-tailed), such that DLPFC patients ($7.17 ± .33) on average gave 
less than healthy participants ($8.91 ± .19) and OFCs ($8.30 ± .35). Critically, we observed 
a significant interaction between condition and cohort (Kruskal-Wallis test on paired 
difference in amount given across 3 cohorts, p < .001, two-tailed), such that damage to 
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DLPFC was associated with significantly lower giving amounts than other cohorts in the 
Message condition but not in the Choice condition, suggesting a reduction in the sensitivity 
to honesty concerns without changes in baseline altruistic tendencies on the part of DLPFC 
patients (Fig. 2b; Supplementary Fig. 3-5). All results are robust to using parametric 
statistical tests. For additional details on the relationship between behavior and demographic 
variables and lesion laterality, see Supplementary Figure 3 and Supplementary Table 3.
To assess the possibility that deficits in cognitive processes unrelated to honesty may have 
produced the observed behavioral differences, we first separated decisions in the Message 
condition where honesty and self-interest were in conflict from decisions where the two 
were aligned (Online Methods). If behavioral patterns observed in DLPFC cohort reflected 
general impairments such as misunderstanding of payoffs or different beliefs about the 
behavior of the signal recipients, we would expect DLPFC patients to be affected on both 
types of decisions. In contrast, we found that DLPFC patients were selectively affected in 
conflict trials (Fig. 2c top) and were indistinguishable from healthy comparison or OFC 
cohorts in no conflict trials (Fig. 2c bottom; Supplementary Fig. 3b). In addition, we did not 
find support for the hypothesis that DLPFC patients exhibited more random choice behavior 
in the Message condition, therefore exerting downward bias on the effect of honesty 
(Supplementary Fig. 6). For additional behavioral results validating task design, see 
Supplementary Fig. 7-8.
The above results are thus consistent with previous suggestions that DLPFC influences 
value computations by diminishing subjective value associated with the pursuit of 
immediate self-interest11, 12. To formally test this mechanistic hypothesis, we used a 
computational approach to characterize how parametric variation in costs and benefits 
associated with honesty influenced choice behavior in our different cohorts. Specifically, we 
assumed the subjective value of an option is influenced not only by monetary consequences 
to self and other but also the means (honest or dishonest) by which these outcomes are 
obtained (Online Methods, Supplementary Table 4)10. We found that the weight placed on 
participants’ own payoff decreased in the Message condition (αM) for the OFC and healthy 
comparison cohorts by approximately 50% relative to the Choice condition (αC; Fig. 3a). 
Strikingly, DLPFC patients’ choices did not exhibit a significant discrepancy in the weight 
across two conditions (Fig. 3b), and were significantly different from those of both healthy 
comparison and OFC cohorts (Fig. 3b).
Together, our findings suggest a necessary role for DLPFC in promoting honesty concerns 
over self-interested motives, and argue against the widely proposed view that the 
involvement of prefrontal regions in honesty reflects the need to engage regulatory 
processes to override truthful responses and implement self-interest3, 13. Under the latter 
hypothesis, damage to prefrontal regions should have been associated with an increased 
sensitivity to honesty concerns, resulting in greater altruistic tendencies when honesty came 
into conflict with self-interest. Instead, the current results are consistent with the idea that 
control is necessary to curb self-interest motives in order to communicate the truth, and 
further suggest that previous neuroimaging findings of DLPFC engagement during dishonest 
behavior reflect active, but ultimately unsuccessful, engagement of control processes, 
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consistent with observations that individuals with control deficits often engage DLPFC 
more14, 15.
In contrast to the DLPFC, we did not observe an effect of OFC damage on behavior, which 
might reflect a number of features of our task, including the reduction of anticipated guilt 
and lack of strong affective components (Supplementary Fig. 9)16, 17. At the same time, we 
cannot completely rule out possible contributions from non-PFC based processes to honesty 
due to the presence of damage to white matter and in some cases extending into adjacent 
regions in our lesion sample (Fig. 1; Supplementary Fig. 1-2). Future studies combining 
larger lesion cohorts with functional connectivity measures will be needed to address these 
questions18. More broadly, by connecting tools and ideas from behavioral economics and 
theoretical biology with those of cognitive neuroscience, our study raises exciting questions 
regarding the degree to which the neurocomputational substrates of honesty are shared with 
other types of norm-guided and moral behavior19, 20, as well as regarding the neural 
mechanisms necessary for arbitrating between such norms in cases of conflict.
Online Methods
Subjects
Patients with focal brain lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (n = 7) and orbitofrontal 
cortex (n = 7) were included in the experiment. Healthy comparison participants (n = 27) 
were recruited from San Francisco Bay Area, CA. All subjects provided informed consent 
approved by the University of California, Berkeley, CA. One DLPFC lesion patient 
answered incorrectly on more than 50% of post instruction questionnaires, and was excluded 
from the study. In comparison no other subjects failed to answer fewer than 90% of the 
questions correctly. All statistical results reported in the study are robust to inclusion of this 
participant.
Table S1
Demographic information and neuropsychological background.
N Age Gender
(F)
Years of
education
Estimated
WAIS1
Etiology Hemisphere
DLPFC 6 57
(8.37)
4 16.17
(2.86)
99
(8.05)
stroke (6) left (5)
right (1)
OFC2 7 46.71
(16.86)
3 15.14
(2.85)
109.83
(9.26)
traumatic brain injury3
(6)
tumor resection (1)
bilateral (6)
left (1)
Healthy
Comparison
27 48.31
(14.40)
12 15.81
(1.10)
105.5
(13.52)
NA NA
Parentheses contain standard deviations. WAIS: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
1WAIS scores were estimated from Shipley Institute of Living Scale.
2
The presented WAIS is an average over 6 OFC patients as one patient did not complete the IQ test.
Lesion Reconstruction
Software reconstructions were performed using MRIcron21. For both patient groups, testing 
took place at least 6 months after the date of the stroke/accident. A neurologist (R.T.K.) 
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inspected patient MRIs to ensure that no white matter hyperintensities outside the lesioned 
area were observed in either patient group. All TBI patients had low impact force injuries 
with no clinical or MRI evidence of axonal shear.
Signaling Games
We used a battery of signaling games extensively studied in behavioral economics and 
evolutionary biology9, 10. These games capture a core dilemma involved in honest behavior 
where interests of the signaler conflicts with those of the signal receiver, such as that of a 
seller (signaler) choosing to either truthfully disclose or misrepresent information about a 
product’s quality, which has direct monetary consequences for the buyer (signal receiver).
These games have three important advantages as an assay of decisions involving tradeoffs 
between honesty and self-interest. First, to isolate the effects of honesty, we included a set of 
Message and Choice conditions. Because the latter condition does not include honesty 
concerns, we remove the tension between honesty and other social preferences and are able 
to control for participants’ concerns for equity and efficiency. As a result, systematic 
deviations in behavior between the two sets of games can be interpreted as being affected by 
honesty concerns. Specifically, an individual who is completely insensitive to honesty 
concerns will behave identically in the two conditions, whereas those sensitive to honesty 
concerns are predicted to behave more generously in the Message condition. In previous 
experiments using these games, introduction of honesty concerns in the Message condition 
has been found to increase cooperation rates and altruistic giving by approximately 
50%1, 2, 10, 22.
Second, the clearly delineated cost-benefit relationship associated with self-interest and 
honesty facilitates a computational account of honesty, which allows us to better connect the 
potential behavioral differences to their computational substrates. Finally, and importantly in 
the context of lesion studies, by explicitly presenting honest and self-interested actions to 
subjects, the Message condition allows us to hold constant the available action set across 
cohorts and verify understanding. This included both comprehension tests and control trials 
with no conflict between honesty and self-interest.
Message and Choice conditions
In the Message condition, the participant in the role of signaler was presented with two 
options, A and B, which yielded different monetary outcomes. For example, in Fig. S1a, 
Option A corresponded to $6 to the signaler and $5 to an anonymous random signal 
recipient, i.e., ($6, $5), and Option B corresponded to ($5, $10). Only the signaler knew the 
payoffs associated with the options, and had to send either an honest or dishonest message to 
an anonymous recipient. The recipient did not know the associated payoffs but had to 
choose one of the two options. That is, the signaler could either choose to convey the truth, 
“Option B will earn you more money than Option A”, or a falsehood, “Option A will earn 
you more money than Option B”. Importantly, all signalers were informed that recipients 
would never know the payment information associated with each option and therefore 
whether senders’ messages were true or not.
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Fig. S1: Task interfaces for (A) Message, (B) Choice conditions.
The monetary outcomes varied across trials. In particular, in some trials we pit self-interest 
against honesty. That is, honest choices were associated with allocations that yielded less 
payment to the participant and more to the recipient (e.g., $5 for self, $15 for other in option 
A; versus $6 for self, $5 for other in option B). We refer these trials as “conflict trials”. In 
“no conflict trials”, honest choices were associated with allocations that yielded more 
payment to both participant and recipient (e.g., $8 for self, $10 for other in option A; versus 
$10 for self, $12 for other in option B). Full list of trial options is presented in 
Supplementary Table 2.
As a control condition, we also included the Choice condition associated with the same set 
of payoff allocations. In particular, participants were asked to directly choose either Option 
A or Option B. Following the procedure of previous experiments using the Message and 
Choice condition2, participants were informed that in the Choice condition (i) their decisions 
would be implemented 80% of the time, while the other 20% of the time the alternative 
option would be implemented; and (ii) receivers would not know the monetary payoff 
associated with each option and would just receive money passively.
Procedure
Following task instructions and comprehension quiz (Appendix A), participants were 
administered two blocks of Message and Choice condition trials, each containing 12 trials 
(Appendix B). All choices were conducted using hypothetical payoffs and no feedback, with 
order of Message and Choice blocks counterbalanced across participants within each cohort. 
Within each block, questions were presented in a random order.
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Behavioral Analysis
In both conditions, the behavioral measure of altruistic giving was defined as the amount 
that would be received by the recipient if the participant’s decision was implemented, which 
for simplify we refer to as “amount given”. Using payoffs given in Fig. S1 as an example, 
the amount given in the Message condition by a participant choosing the truthful (false) 
Message 2 (1) would be defined as $10 ($5). Similarly, in the Choice condition, the amount 
given by a participant choosing Option A (B) would be defined as $5 ($10).
Computational Modeling
To characterize the relative contributions of economic self-interest, distributional preference, 
and honesty consideration to allocation decisions, we adapted an economic model that 
previously applied to study social preferences23 to our tasks.
First, denote Ms and Mo as monetary payoffs for self and other respectively. The indicator 
function I is equal to 1 when the monetary payoff is achieved through dishonesty and 0 
otherwise. That is, I indicates whether honesty concerns are overridden. We propose that the 
decision-maker’s utility is modulated by honesty in addition to monetary allocations to self 
and other:
Here α and ρ are parameters capturing distributional preferences that solely depend upon the 
monetary allocation between self and other, whereas δ quantifies the biasing effects of 
honesty concerns. The functional form follows the well-established Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution utility function24.
Specifically, the parameter α quantifies the relative weight between monetary payoffs for 
self and other. A large α indicates a larger weight on own economic gain. The parameter ρ 
reflects the elasticity of substitution between Ms and Mo. For example, if ρ approaches 1, the 
utility function will reduce to a linear function representing the preference of welfare 
maximizing. If ρ approaches negative infinity, the utility function will reduce to U(Ms, Mo , 
I) = min(Ms, Mo), which corresponds to the preference of maximal inequity aversion.
In the context of our game, we refer to α as the weight placed on own payoff in the Choice 
condition, as there is no tradeoff between self-interest and honesty. That is, αC = α. In 
contrast, the weight placed on own payoff in the Message condition is defined by αM = α − 
δ. Critically, the parameter δ can be interpreted as the degree to which honesty reduces self-
interested motives. If δ > 0, the signaler suffers from a disutility of deception and is more 
likely to sacrifice self-interest in favor of honesty concerns. In contrast, if δ < 0, the signaler 
receives an additional utility from dishonesty, and thus is more likely to choose dishonest 
options. Finally, if δ = 0, the signaler is indifferent between honest or dishonest actions and 
will behave as if the tradeoff between honesty and dishonesty does not exist. The 
combination of these parameters thus nests a wide range of social preferences proposed by 
existing theory and allows for rich interactions among economic self-interest, distributional 
preferences and honesty considerations.
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To calibrate the model given the binary choice behavior of each cohort in the game, we 
adopted the standard logit assumption, aggregated observations conditional on lesion cohorts 
and experimental conditions and conducted maximal likelihood estimation, specifically 
maximizing the log likelihood function Σi Σt log (Pi,t(yit; αM, αC, ρ)). The standard errors of 
estimated parameters were obtained through the bootstrap procedure with 200 iterations for 
each cohort.
Experiment Instructions
Preamble (delivered verbally)
Imagine that there are anonymous participants in some other rooms that you would never 
meet and whose identity you would not know, and vice versa. You can assume that none of 
you are able to communicate with each other. For convenience, we may sometimes refer to 
these hypothetical participants as “your partner”, but no prior relationship is implied.
Message Condition
This part of the experiment describes a situation involving you and one other person.
In each decision you will be asked to select between two messages, where the message that 
you choose will be sent to the other person. After reading your message, the other person 
will have to make a choice, which will determine the payoffs for both of you.
There are 12 questions altogether. Consider each question separately. That is, treat each 
decision as if it alone will determine the final payoffs. Although the questions are 
hypothetical, please do your best to respond as if the decisions are for real money.
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Quiz:
1. In Message 1 “ Option A will earn you more money than option B”, who does 
“you” refer to?
a. Own
b. The other person
2. Is Message 1 true?
a. Yes
b. No
3. Is Message 2 true?
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a. Yes
b. No
4. The other person will select between Option A and Option B after receiving the 
message you selected.
a. True
b. False
5. Will the other person know whether or not the message you send him is true?
a. Yes
b. No
6. How much will you receive, if the other person selects option A?
a. $7
b. $10
7. How much will the other person receive, if they select option A?
a. $7
b. $10
8. Will the other person know the amount to be paid to you according to option B, if 
they select option A?
a. Yes
b. No
Choice Condition
This part of the experiment describes a situation involving you and one other person.
In each decision you will be asked to select between two options, where the option that you 
choose will determine the payoffs for you and the other person.
There are 10 questions altogether. Consider each question separately. That is, treat each 
decision as if it alone will determine the final payoffs. Although the questions are 
hypothetical, please do your best to respond as if the decisions are for real money.
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Quiz:
1. Which option will give you more money on average?
a. Option A
b. Option B
2. Which option will give the other person more money on average?
a. Option A
b. Option B
3. Will the other person know how much you receive?
a. Yes
b. No
A supplementary methods checklist is available.
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Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. 
Lesion reconstruction. Structural MRI slices illustrating the lesion overlap across the two 
patient groups. (a) For the DLPFC group (n = 6), mean lesion volume was 125.76 cm3 and 
maximal cortical lesion overlap (>50%) was in the Brodmann areas 6, 8, 9 and 46, 
encompassing portions of the middle and superior frontal gyri in all patients. All dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex lesions (5L; 1R) were shown overlapped to the left hemisphere for 
comparison purposes. For lateralized and individual reconstruction see Supplementary Fig. 
1-2 and Supplementary Table 1. (b) For the orbitofrontal cortex group (n = 7), mean lesion 
volume was 72.29 cm3 and maximal cortical lesion overlap (>50%) was in Brodmann areas 
10, 11, and 47, centered in the OFC and including portions of inferior and superior frontal 
gyri in some patients. See Online Methods for details.
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Figure 2. 
Experimental paradigm and behavioral results. (a) Experimental paradigm. In the Message 
condition, the participant in the role of the signaler is presented with two options, A and B, 
associated with different monetary consequences. For example, Option A corresponds to 
$15 to the participant and $5 to an anonymous signal recipient, i.e., ($15, $5), and Option B 
corresponds to ($5, $15). There are furthermore two actions available to the participant in 
the form of two statements describing the monetary consequences of the options to the 
recipient. Specifically, the participants must choose between sending a truthful message 
(Message 2) that sacrifices economic self-interest in favor of honesty, or a false message 
(Message 1) that satisfies self-interest at the expense of being honest. See Online Methods 
for details. (b) Amount given. In the Choice condition, all cohorts gave similar amounts to 
the recipient (Healthy Comparison: $7.44 ± .22; DLPFC: $6.65 ± .38; OFC: $6.79 ± .35; 
Kruskal-Wallis test, p > .10, two-tailed). In the Message condition with identical monetary 
consequences but with the addition of honesty concerns, healthy participants increased 
giving by $2.94 ± .44. In contrast, DLPFC cohort’s giving increased by less than half this 
amount ($1.05 ± .43), and significantly lower than those of the healthy comparison cohort 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, p < .001, two-tailed). Finally, OFC participants were nearly 
identical to healthy participants ($3.01 ± .55; Wilcoxon rank sum test, p > .50, two-tailed), 
and significantly different from DLPFC participants (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p < .001, two-
tailed). (c) Conflict and no conflict trials. On trials in the Message condition where honesty 
motives conflicted with those of self-interest (Top), DLPFC patients made a significantly 
lower proportion of honest choices (36.7% + 5.75%) compared to OFC and healthy 
comparison cohorts (OFCs: 75.7% + 5.44%; healthy participants: 83.3% + 3.00%; Fisher’s 
exact test, p < .01 for both, two-tailed). In contrast, on trials where conflict was absent 
(Bottom), no significant differences existed between cohorts (Fisher’s exact test, p > .20, 
two-tailed). All error bars indicate SEMs.
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Figure 3. 
Computational modeling. (a) Green shaded region captures willingness to sacrifice own 
payoffs to send the true message, i.e., bias toward honesty, where weight on self-interest in 
the Message condition (αM) is reduced relative to the Choice condition (αC). Conversely, 
red shaded region captures willingness to sacrifice own payoffs to send the false message, 
i.e., bias toward dishonesty, where αM is greater than αC. All cohorts placed similar weights 
on one’s own payoff in the Choice condition (DLPFC: . 82 ± .05, OFC: . 79 ± .07 and 
healthy comparison: . 73 ± .05). In the Message condition, OFC and healthy participants 
showed a significant reduction in weight on own payoff, whereas DLPFC participants did 
not differ significantly between the two conditions (DLPFC: . 75 ± .09; OFC: .43 ± .06; and 
healthy comparison:. 29 ± .04). Solid points represent parameter estimates and smaller 
points represent bootstrap pseudo-sample estimates. Dashed ellipses correspond to 
bootstrapped standard errors. (b) Taking paired-wise differences in pseudo-sample estimates 
of αM and αC, OFC and healthy participants showed significantly lower weight on own 
payoff in the Message condition as compared to the Choice condition (p < .01, two-tailed), 
whereas the DLPFC cohort did not exhibit a significant difference (p > .05, two-tailed; all 
error bars indicate bootstrap standard errors).
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